Out of Sight, Out of Mind? UK-EU Member States Bilateralism as an Enabler of Europeanisation

JCMS | 17 January 2025

by Sarah Wolff (Leiden University), Helena Carrapico (Northumbria University), and Agathe Piquet (UC Louvain)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the great work published in JCMS during autumn 2024. Here we feature the findings of ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind? UK-EU Member States Bilateralism as an Enabler of Europeanisation’, which was published as part of the Symposium on ‘Selective Reconstruction: Re-engagement in the Post-Brexit UK-EU Security Relationship’.

Extensive scholarship has examined the UK’s role in multilateral (e.g. United Nations, World Trade Organisation) and mini-lateral venues (e.g. E3 with France and Germany on Iran; G7 and G20 on economic issues) since Brexit, but less attention has been given to the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU Member States from 2021 to 2023. Bilateralism has been one of the UK’s preferred strategies for achieving foreign policy coordination with EU Member States post-Brexit. This article finds that, despite clear efforts to de-EUise UK foreign policy, there is no evidence of purposeful de-Europeanisation.

Purposeful de-Europeanisation would imply a repudiation of shared European values, a divergence from common priorities, and an end to social encounters between UK and EU member state officials. Instead, through a frame analysis of these declarations and interviews, the article highlights that bilateralism has enabled continued Europeanisation, albeit to a lesser extent compared to the pre-Brexit situation. Closer relations with European capitals have thus allowed Europeanisation of UK foreign policy to persist. In other words, while the UK has distanced itself from the EU as a political entity, it has not rejected the common European values and priorities that remain shared with EU Member States.

De-EUisation and Europeanisation in foreign policy: conceptual and methodological reflections

Renewed bilateralism, initiated by the UK through the 24 joint statements it agreed upon with EU Member States, raises questions about the UK government’s intentions regarding EUisation and Europeanisation of its foreign policy. The recent strengthening of these bilateral ties (e.g. with the war in Ukraine), during a time of troubled relations with the EU, could suggest the UK’s intention to pursue ideational transfers.

To understand the UK’s intentions in its post-Brexit bilateralism, it is crucial to distinguish between EUisation and Europeanisation. EUisation refers to the more top-down transfer of institutional and organisational practices and policies between the EU and its Member States. In contrast, Europeanisation is a broader process of social learning and diffusion of ideas and values through multiple interactions, including those outside formal EU structures.

In the context of foreign policy, we argue that de-EUisation is characterised by three dynamics that reflect the institutional, political and organisational aspects of policy change:

1. the disengagement from EU structures, ranging from a reduced rhetoric or substantive support and commitment to a complete withdrawal;
2. the rescaling of foreign policy discourse namely, where non-EU geographical spaces are given preference; and
3. the reorganisation of foreign policy bureaucracy through a reinforced control over the national officials seconded to Brussels, including a redeployment of staff away from EU institutions.

De-Europeanisation, on the other hand, is made of three cognitive and social processes:

1. the rejection of shared European values;
2. the divergence from ‘previously established common European […] priorities that have emerged through Europeanisation’, resulting from ideational transfers and discussions; and
3. the end of social encounters with European national officials, including outside formal EU venues.

Using this framework, this article examines the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU member states to assess whether they reflect intentions of de-EUisation, de-Europeanisation, or a continuation of Europeanisation in the UK’s foreign policy.

De-EUising but still Europeanising: away from Brussels but closer to European capitals

The analysis of bilateral declarations underscores the de-EUisation of UK foreign policy, marked by disengagement from EU structures, a re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to the global level discourse, and counter-Brusselisation via bureaucratic reorganisation.

The UK’s foreign policy has increasingly shifted away from the EU, especially under the leadership of Boris Johnson. The Global Britain strategy emphasised the UK’s autonomy and global ambitions, with less emphasis on EU cooperation. This shift was evident in the UK’s decision to have a reduced involvement in EU foreign policy structures and its focus on bilateral relations with individual EU member states. The signing of bilateral declarations with EU countries was part of this broader strategy.

These declarations reveal limited references to the EU, with most emphasising the desire to go beyond current UK-EU cooperation frameworks. Comparatively, there are more references to cooperation through NATO, highlighting the UK’s preference for alternative multilateral venues over EU structures. This re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to a global level and the bureaucratic reorganisation of UK institutions, including the transformation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office into the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), further illustrate the UK’s de-EUisation efforts. The reduction of UK staff in Brussels and the redeployment of personnel to bilateral embassies in Europe also signalled a shift away from an EU-centric foreign policy.

Secondly, the article finds that despite the clear trends of de-EUisation, the bilateral declarations also suggest a desire for continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy. This is evidenced by three dynamics:

1. Persistent Shared Values: The bilateral declarations consistently align with EU foreign policy values, including human rights, democracy, international law, and multilateralism. These shared values and the many references to a specific European like-minded community reflect a continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy, even as the UK seeks to redefine its global role.
2. Convergence Towards Shared Security Priorities: The UK’s bilateral declarations with EU member states also demonstrate a strong alignment with EU security priorities, ranging from international conflicts, cybersecurity and disinformation, to migration, organised crime and terrorism. This common understanding of priorities suggests that the UK remains committed to addressing shared security challenges with its European partners, even outside formal EU structures.
3. Continuation of Social Encounters: The bilateral agreements emphasise the importance of regular consultations and meetings between UK and EU officials, ensuring the exchange of ideas and practices, including through new fora (e.g. joint trainings, joint defence capabilities). While the level of institutionalisation achieved through these bilateral agreements may not match that of the EU framework, they still provide a mechanism for social learning and ideational transfers, contributing therefore to continued Europeanisation.

Conclusion

Could the recent intensification in UK foreign policy bilateralism be seen as an instance of de-EUisation and/or de-Europeanisation of its foreign policy? Despite the UK’s exit from EU structures, shift towards global ambitions, and reorganisation of its administration to reduce EU focus, Europeanisation persists through extensive bilateral diplomatic ties. The UK continues to promote values and priorities fundamental to European countries and maintains social interactions with European capitals. This ongoing Europeanisation is not solely a product of the UK’s former EU membership but is also rooted in broader historical ties and shared values across Europe.

The article contributes to understanding the evolution of bilateralism in times of crisis, with UK and EU partners seeking closer cooperation in response to challenges such as the war in the Ukraine. We call for further research on how polycrisis, including the Eurozone debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, has intensified bilateralism both within the EU and between the EU and third countries, questioning whether this trend strengthens or undermines European integration.

Sarah Wolff is Professor in International Studies and Global Politics at the University of Leiden. She is an expert on EU-UK relations, EU migration policy as well as the gender and religious dimension of EU foreign policy. She can be followed on Linkedin.

Helena Farrand Carrapico is Professor in International Relations and European Politics at Northumbria University, UK. Her research focuses on European internal security governance, in particular on the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit. She can be followed on LinkedIn.

Agathe Piquet is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles. Her primary research interest lies in EU internal security policies, with a particular focus on the processes of Europeanisation. She can be followed on Linkedin.